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This article presents a streamlined approach to seismic hazard assessment 8 
aimed at providing regulatory assurance, whilst acknowledging commercial and 9 
program constraints associated with the development of safety-critical facilities. 10 
The approach was developed based on international best practice and followed the 11 
spirit of the Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC) Level 2 12 
requirements, while incorporating the key features of the SSHAC Level 3 process 13 
aimed at achieving regulatory assurance, but with a more flexible implementation. 14 
It has also benefited from experience gained by others regarding the 15 
implementation of the SSHAC process in projects in the USA, Switzerland and 16 
South Africa. The approach has been successfully applied as part of the Safety 17 
Case for the new-build nuclear power plant at Hinkley Point, UK. The proposed 18 
approach can be considered as a cost-effective solution for the seismic hazard 19 
evaluation of safety-significant facilities where a high level of regulatory 20 
assurance is required. 21 
Keywords: PSHA, Safety-critical Facilities, SSHAC, Regulatory Assurance, UK 22 
1. Introduction 23 
The UK government energy policy currently considers the development of eight new 24 
nuclear power plants (NPPs). Hinkley Point C is expected to be the first of this new fleet of 25 
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power plants to be built, and it will be the first nuclear plant to be built in the UK since 1995 26 
when Sizewell B became operational. 27 
Table 1 List of abbreviations 28 
Abbreviation Meaning Abbreviation Meaning 
CBR Centre, body and range PRT Peer review team 
CEUS Central and eastern United States SAP Safety assessment principles 
CH2M CH2M Hill SE Subject Expert 
EDF Électricité de France SSC Seismic source characterization 
GEM Global Earthquake Model SSM Seismic source model 
GMM Ground-motion model SHWP Seismic Hazard Working Party 
HID Hazard input document SRID Site response input document  
IAEA International Atomic Energy 
Agency 
SSHAC Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis 
Committee 
NNB GenCo Nuclear New Build Generation 
Company (subsidiary of EDF 
Energy) 
TAG Technical assessment guides 
NPP Nuclear power plant TDI Technically defensible interpretations 
ONR Office for Nuclear Regulation TDT Technical Delivery Team 
PSHA Probabilistic seismic hazard 
analysis 
TI Technical Integrator 
PMT Project management team USNRC US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
PPRP Participatory peer review panel   
 29 
As part of the UK regulatory requirements for new NPPs, utility operators are required to 30 
undertake a robust assessment of external hazards, including earthquake-related hazards, as a 31 
critical part of the NPP safety case. Such an assessment must be carried out following 32 
relevant good practice and to the satisfaction of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR). 33 
The UK government operates a non-prescriptive, goal-setting approach to nuclear safety 34 
regulation. This means that the ONR sets out its regulatory expectations and requires duty-35 
holders to determine how best to achieve them and justify their chosen approach. The ONR 36 
inspectors use Safety Assessment Principles (SAPs) (ONR 2014), together with Technical 37 
Assessment Guides (TAGs), to guide the regulatory decision-making process. However, 38 
owing to the ONR’s non-prescriptive approach, these documents do not provide detailed 39 
guidance, although they have been developed to be consistent with the International Atomic 40 
Energy Agency’s (IAEA) safety standards, to which they make reference.  41 
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In addition to the IAEA safety standards, the ONR guidance also recognizes the validity 42 
of “relevant good practice” from other industries, as long as it is demonstrated to be 43 
appropriate to the specific nuclear application. Furthermore, regulatory guidelines 44 
acknowledge that “reactors built in the UK should be at least as safe as modern reactors 45 
anywhere else in the world” whilst preventing “gold-plating of reactor designs for use in the 46 
UK” (HSE 2009). 47 
Given the hiatus between the last construction of NPPs in the UK (mid 1990s) and the 48 
current new build, the reorganization of the regulator (from Nuclear Installations Inspectorate 49 
to Office for Nuclear Regulation), and the ONR’s non-prescriptive approach to seismic safety 50 
cases, there was uncertainty as to what standards in new PSHA studies would be considered 51 
acceptable by ONR. 52 
It was in this context that CH2M (now Jacobs) and collaborators developed an innovative 53 
approach to PSHA aimed at providing regulatory assurance, whilst acknowledging the 54 
commercial and program constraints faced by utility operators in the UK. This paper presents 55 
the background to the development of the approach and discusses the main 56 
differences/adaptations from the SSHAC process for Level 2 and Level 3 studies (Budnitz et 57 
al. 1997; USNRC 2012). The approach to PSHA presented in this paper has successfully been 58 
implemented for the seismic hazard evaluation underpinning the Safety Case for the Hinkley 59 
Point C site, which is described in detail in Tromans et al. (2018). 60 
It should be noted that TAG-13 on external hazards is currently being updated (ONR 61 
2017a), including its Annex 1 on seismic hazards (ONR 2017b), to provide more detail on 62 
regulatory expectations for its evaluation (ONR Expert Panel on Natural Hazards 2017). A 63 
draft version of the updated TAG-13 was circulated by the ONR for comments from industry 64 
in late 2017 and the final version is expected to be published in autumn 2018. The approach 65 
presented in this study is expected to be in agreement with the updated TAG-13 guidelines. 66 
2. PSHA approach development background 67 
The UK has a strong tradition of using PSHA for the evaluation of the seismic hazard for 68 
NPPs, dating back to the 1980s when the Seismic Hazard Working Party (SHWP) carried out 69 
seismic hazard assessments for a number of UK NPP sites (Musson 2014). The SHWP was a 70 
group of specialist consultants led by David Mallard of the Central Electricity Generating 71 
Board, including staff from Principia Mechanica Ltd. and Soil Mechanics Ltd. The SHWP 72 
developed a set of working practices for the evaluation of the seismic hazard, which were 73 
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published as a two-volume methodology report: Volume 3M (SHWP 1988) and its 74 
supplement (SHWP 1991). Although the SHWP methodology, which included treatment of 75 
uncertainties through a logic-tree framework and consideration of multiple expert judgement, 76 
was state-of-the-art at the time, it no longer represents best practice when compared against 77 
modern standards and was therefore assessed as unlikely to be acceptable by the ONR to 78 
support the Safety Case of a new-build NPP. Nevertheless, it sets a ‘regulatory precedent’, 79 
which has to be considered alongside methodological developments in the intervening years. 80 
A few years after the work by the SHWP was completed, in the mid-1990s the Senior 81 
Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC) published in the USA what is commonly 82 
known as the SSHAC guidelines (Budnitz et al. 1997). These guidelines, which have been 83 
endorsed by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) as the 84 
recommended approach for the development of new models to be used in PSHA (e.g., 85 
Regulatory Guide 1.208, USNRC 2007), focused on methodological aspects of the PSHA, 86 
aiming in particular to provide a structured framework for multiple-expert hazard 87 
assessments. The underlying motivation was to reconcile the findings of two multi-expert 88 
PSHA studies for NPP sites in the Central and Eastern United States (Bernreuter et al. 1989; 89 
EPRI 1989), discrepancies between which were found to stem primarily from procedural 90 
differences. The SSHAC guidelines define four levels of PSHA study, reflecting increasing 91 
levels of technical complexity and resources allocated to the study, as described in Table 4.2 92 
of NUREG-2117 (USNRC 2012). A notable feature of this classification scheme is the large 93 
increment in both complexity and regulatory assurance between the lower (1 and 2) and 94 
higher (3 and 4) levels of study. The higher levels of study are generally associated with a 95 
greater level of regulatory assurance owing to the greater level of effort expended to capture 96 
the centre, body and range (CBR) of technically defensible interpretations (TDI), which is the 97 
common goal of all four levels. For this reason, the USNRC requires Level 3 or 4 studies for 98 
nuclear facilities. 99 
Since its publication, the SSHAC process has been used for numerous natural hazard 100 
studies not only in the USA but also worldwide, in particular those developed for safety-101 
critical facilities such as NPPs. Examples of this are the PEGASOS project (Abrahamson et 102 
al. 2002) and PEGASOS Refinement Project (Renault 2013) in Switzerland, and the 103 
Thyspunt project in South Africa (Bommer et al. 2015). As a result, the original SSHAC 104 
guidelines have recently been supplemented by NUREG-2117 (USNRC 2012) in order to 105 
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incorporate practical insights gained during recent PSHA projects implementing the higher 106 
levels of the SSHAC process.  107 
Efforts have also been made to suggest solutions to improve the cost-effectiveness of 108 
SSHAC studies. In particular, Coppersmith and Bommer (2012) proposed that for multiple 109 
sites, a regional SSHAC Level 3 or 4 study followed by site-specific Level 2 refinement 110 
studies represented the most efficient solution in terms of cost and duration. This approach 111 
has been implemented in the development of regional seismic source (CEUS-SSC project; 112 
Salomone 2015) and ground-motion models for the Central and Eastern United States (EPRI 113 
2013). Bommer (2010) recommended a similar approach be adopted for the UK. However, to 114 
date, SSHAC guidelines have not been applied in the UK. 115 
At present, guidance for the organization of SSHAC studies is well-developed for Levels 116 
3 and 4 but is limited for Levels 1 and 2. This will be addressed in a forthcoming update to 117 
NUREG-2117 (Juckett et al. 2016, USNRC 2018), which for obvious reasons was not 118 
available for the development of the PSHA approach described in the present paper. A wide 119 
variety of approaches can technically be considered “Level 2”, even when the engagement of 120 
outside experts is minimal. When utility operators are on a tight schedule, as is the case for 121 
UK new build NPP, the long duration of level 3 and 4 studies, which would normally be 122 
more than two-and-a-half years for a SSHAC Level 3 study (Coppersmith et al. 2013; 123 
Bommer and Coppersmith 2013), is a source of difficulty. 124 
Fortunately, the UK sites currently under consideration for new-build NPPs are all 125 
located in the immediate vicinity of operational or decommissioned NPPs, and as a result 126 
there is an extensive body of pre-existing site-specific information available for modern 127 
PSHA studies. However, given the safety-critical nature of NPP sites, the level of regulatory 128 
assurance required remains high. Therefore, there was a need for a more compact study, 129 
closer to a SSHAC Level 2 study in terms of duration and cost, but with a similar level of 130 
regulatory assurance to a SSHAC Level 3 study. A Level 2/3 approach is not sanctioned by 131 
the SSHAC guidelines (Bommer and Coppersmith 2013); anything that falls between the 132 
specification for Level 2 and Level 3 is de facto Level 2. However, as long as the hybrid 133 
approach, which could be classified as an “enhanced Level 2”, meets the approval of both the 134 
operator (for cost and timescale) and the regulator (for regulatory assurance), it is a practical 135 
solution. It is worth noting that the forthcoming update to NUREG-2117 is expected to 136 
specifically sanction Level 2 studies with augmented options. In this sense, the procedure 137 
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developed and applied for the Hinkley PSHA could be considered as an illustrative example 138 
and practical application of the general concept of an enhanced Level 2 study. 139 
Our approach to PSHA, discussed in this paper, is in line with international best practice 140 
and follows the principles of the SSHAC Level 2 requirements, but incorporates key features 141 
of the SSHAC Level 3 process, particularly those aimed at achieving regulatory assurance. 142 
The structure of the project and roles of the various participants is more flexible than in the 143 
SSHAC approach, allowing for adjustments to the approach as the project develops based on 144 
knowledge acquired during the execution of the project and making more efficient use of the 145 
already limited pool of available experts in the field. 146 
3. Project structure and implementation 147 
As previously discussed, the proposed methodology does not formally follow the 148 
framework of a SSHAC Level 3 study. It was developed so as to satisfy all the requirements 149 
of a SSHAC Level 2 study, but with a particular emphasis on incorporating those elements of 150 
a SSHAC Level 3 process that contribute to regulatory assurance. Regulatory assurance is 151 
defined in NUREG-2117 (USNRC 2012) as “confidence that views of the larger technical 152 
community have been properly considered and that the center, body, and range of technically 153 
defensible interpretations has been represented and documented”. Elements that have been 154 
identified as particularly important to achieve regulatory assurance include: 155 
 Number of participants, with a larger project team, of similar size as normally required 156 
for a SSHAC Level 3 study, and several international (UK, US and continental Europe) 157 
Subject Experts (eleven in total); 158 
 Participatory nature of peer-review, allowing for participation at all stages, not only at 159 
workshops, the incorporation of feedback and correction of issues as soon as they arise, 160 
rather than at a late stage in the process; 161 
 Transparency of interactions, with thorough documentation of the decision process (see 162 
Section 4.4), and the participation of client’s and nuclear regulator’s representatives at the 163 
various workshops run throughout the project in an observer role; 164 
 Clear recognition of cognitive biases, in particular the distinction between resource and 165 
proponent views; and 166 
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 The iterative nature of the collective process of reducing epistemic uncertainties within 167 
the seismic hazard community, with each new project benefiting from the insights gained 168 
and lessons learnt in previously completed projects. 169 
Consistent with this perspective, the proposed approach aimed to develop further the 170 
methodology implemented to date, by others, in other similar projects and to incorporate 171 
insights gained from personal involvement of individual project team members in recently 172 
completed SSHAC Level 3 and 4 projects. These are predominantly based on experiences of 173 
the SSHAC Level 3 PSHA for the Thyspunt new-build NPP site in South Africa (Bommer et 174 
al. 2015), and the refinement phase of the PEGASOS project for the revision of the design 175 
bases at four NPP sites in Switzerland (Renault 2015). Methodological aspects of other 176 
recently completed SSHAC Level 3 studies were also considered. 177 
4. Project delivery team structure 178 
The project delivery team structure is shown in Figure 1. As illustrated, the project 179 
delivery structure is similar to that of a SSHAC Level 3 study, with the main difference being 180 
the amalgamation of Resource Experts and Proponent Experts, as per SSHAC terminology, 181 
into the single role of Subject Experts and the consideration of two independent Hazard 182 
Calculation teams, which significantly contributed towards the QA process and increased 183 
regulatory assurance. Other aspects of the SSHAC Level 3 structure, including an 184 
independent Peer Review Team overseeing the project from inception (fundamental for the 185 
objective of achieving regulatory assurance), and a larger Technical Delivery Team 186 
(Technical Integrator Team as per SSHAC terminology) were kept. 187 
8 
 188 
Fig. 1 Hinkley PSHA project delivery team and team structure 189 
Solid lines in Figure 1 represent direct formal interactions between the various groups of 190 
the project. Dashed lines represent a close interaction between the PRT and the TDT, while 191 
the PMT remain as the “formal” channel of communication, and the possibility for the PRT 192 
to co-opt SEs to their team to assist with their PRT role when considered necessary (see also 193 
discussion in Section 4.3). 194 
Note that since the approach deviates from the guidelines for a SSHAC Level 3 study, the 195 
terminology adopted deliberately avoids the use of SSHAC terminology, to prevent confusion 196 
between original and adapted concepts. 197 
The Technical Delivery Team (TDT) was an amalgamation of CH2M’s internal 198 
specialists, combined with key experts in the form of retained consultants and sub-consultants 199 
from the University of Edinburgh (formerly at the British Geological Survey) and the 200 
University of Strathclyde (formerly at the Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières). 201 
The Peer Review Team (PRT) was composed of experts external to CH2M, which was 202 
considered essential to maintain their independence. PRT members were selected based not 203 
only on their experience and technical knowledge of the PSHA process, but also their 204 
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knowledge of the SSHAC process through participation in previous SSHAC Level 3 and 205 
Level 4 studies. 206 
4.1. Project plan 207 
Overall, the Project Plan followed the structure of a SSHAC Level 3 as described in 208 
NUREG-2117 with a phased approach punctuated by working meetings and workshops 209 
representing the key milestones in the development of the project. Figure 2 presents the 210 
project plan for the Hinkley PSHA, which consists of three phases: 211 
Phase 1 – Study Definition Stage concentrated on defining the scope of works necessary 212 
for a detailed and robust PSHA. It also included a high-level review of existing data and 213 
studies, identification of hazard sensitive issues, identification of further data requirements 214 
and the setup of a databank for relevant information. 215 
Phase 2 – Implementation Stage constituted the main part of the project, including Subject 216 
Expert and PRT interactions, development of the models, and calculations. 217 
Phase 3 – Support Stage consisted of any ad hoc support to the client, NNB GenCo, on 218 
the Safety Case submission, as required. 219 
10 
 220 
Fig. 2 Hinkley PSHA project plan 221 
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Within the context of the project plan, the term “workshop” was taken in the conceptual 222 
sense, and denoted any form of interaction (physical or virtual) within the TDT (‘internal’ 223 
Definition Workshops), or between the TDT and the PRT (Presentation Workshops), to 224 
which the client’s representatives, and the ONR’s representatives and retained experts were 225 
invited in the role of Observer to satisfy themselves that these interactions were in line with 226 
the project objectives. The study methodology also provided the PRT with the discretion to 227 
invite a number of Subject Experts to attend the Presentation Workshops, as co-opted 228 
members of the PRT. 229 
The Definition Workshops had the objective of discussing within the TDT and agreeing 230 
on the interim seismic source model (SSM) and ground-motion model (GMM) components 231 
of the PSHA based on the review and interpretation of the available data, the expert 232 
engagement process, and the findings from the preliminary hazard calculations. Following 233 
the Definition Workshops, the TDT presented the technical justification for the interim 234 
models to the PRT, in two formal Presentation Workshops, covering the SSM and GMM 235 
components of the study. A Final Presentation Workshop was also run to help finalize 236 
outstanding issues before the final hazard calculations. This process gave the TDT the 237 
opportunity to obtain feedback from experts outside the TDT before finalization of the 238 
relevant models. 239 
Although the large majority of the TDT members were based in two fairly nearby offices 240 
in the UK (London and Swindon), due to the logistical constraints imposed by the 241 
compressed project duration, video- and tele-conference facilities were used during working 242 
meetings and workshops when required. Such facilities were also used for interactions 243 
between the TDT and SEs, mainly for those based in the US or continental Europe, and with 244 
the PRT, which were based in Switzerland and Norway. Such “virtual” workshops can also 245 
be used in projects with a more generous schedule as a cost-effective tool. Presentation 246 
Workshops were scheduled to allow for attendance in-person of all members of the PRT, 247 
including PRT co-opted Subject Experts, and key relevant members of the TDT. 248 
An important element of the Project Plan was the definition of formal communication and 249 
reporting protocols that would allow the efficient and controlled exchange of information 250 
between the various parties, with particular attention to how elicitation of expert judgement 251 
would be undertaken and recorded, and how the independence of the PRT would be 252 
demonstrated; both of these elements being crucial for the goal of achieving regulatory 253 
assurance. The protocols adopted for the Hinkley PSHA are summarized in Figure 3. 254 
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 255 
Fig. 3 Hinkley PSHA communications chart 256 
4.2. Subject Expert roles 257 
In practice, it is often inevitable that multiple expert roles within the same project are 258 
taken on by the same individual (e.g. an evaluator expert may also be the proponent of a 259 
model, or a resource expert on specific data). The SSHAC guidelines allow for such 260 
situations, provided the change in expert role is explicitly acknowledged and made clear to all 261 
other evaluators, and that, when returning to their role as an evaluator, the expert carries out 262 
their assessment in an impartial and objective way. The process of challenges from other 263 
evaluators within the team and the general oversight by the participatory peer review panel 264 
(PPRP, as per SSHAC terminology) ensure that the guidelines are met. Also, practical 265 
implementation has revealed the difficulty in finding a consistent terminology for individuals 266 
assisting the delivery process without being part of the (core) Technical Integrator (TI, as per 267 
SSHAC terminology) team in terms of ownership of the models. Such individuals have been 268 
variously described as “database developers” or “technical support staff”, while performing 269 
tasks that were often similar in nature to the contributions of resource experts. 270 
For the approach presented herein, the concept of “Subject Expert” (SE) was therefore 271 
developed. This was defined as any individual who contributes on one or more technical 272 
aspect(s) (data, model, interpretation) of the technical delivery process, without, however, 273 
having an ownership stake in the model developed. Although a number of members of the 274 
TDT are expected to fulfil the role of SEs for some technical aspects of the PSHA, for 275 
simplicity of the approach and terminology, the term of SE was applied only to specialists co-276 
opted from outside the TDT.  277 
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Although the combined expertise of the TDT was broad, it has to be acknowledged that in 278 
a small-to-medium sized team, it is unlikely that interactions within the TDT alone are 279 
sufficient to capture the full breadth of technically defensible interpretations. Therefore, the 280 
TDT had to identify and enter into discussions with SEs within the wider technical 281 
community to ensure that the project captured, documented, and understood the significance 282 
and relevance of the available data, and any valid alternative interpretations. Identification of 283 
the subject areas requiring expert engagement, and the subsequent selection of suitable 284 
Subject Experts, was an iterative process considering technical factors such as specialisms 285 
and level of expertise, but also heeding logistical project constraints, such as availability 286 
within the project timeframe. This selection process was carried out in conjunction with the 287 
PRT. 288 
Engagement of SEs was based on face-to-face meetings, or teleconferences, between each 289 
individual expert and relevant members of the TDT. Depending on whether resolution of the 290 
topics discussed during the meeting was achieved or not, additional meetings were scheduled. 291 
In advance of each meeting, SEs were provided with relevant project-specific information on 292 
the topic to be discussed, which may include data, preliminary interpretations of the data or 293 
models, or preliminary results of a particular analysis, inter alia. Following each of the 294 
interviews, agreed summaries of the discussions were formally captured and documented as 295 
part of the project records, and approved by the SE. The summaries of the SE interviews were 296 
made available to the PRT for their consideration and feedback. 297 
One of the main differences with the expert interaction approach required for a SSHAC 298 
Level 3 study was that no formal direct interaction between individual SEs took place, as it 299 
would in the second workshop of a SSHAC Level 3 study. In most cases, more than one 300 
expert was interviewed on a particular topic, interviews with different SEs occurred relatively 301 
closely in time to each other, and more than one interview with the same SE was often 302 
required (particularly on the most controversial issues). Therefore, SEs were often made 303 
aware of other SEs’ view on the same topic. This could be argued to represent an informal 304 
type of interaction between SEs. Additionally, for methodological uncertainties that are not 305 
region- or site-specific, the “slipstream effect” generated by the publication of detailed 306 
documentation of expert elicitation and interaction on specific topics in other recent projects 307 
should be acknowledged, since the availability of such documentation greatly facilitates the 308 
capture of the CBR of the TDI. 309 
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The approach adopted for the engagement of experts was not as comprehensive as that 310 
required for a formal SSHAC Level 3 study. However, it allowed for greater flexibility, and 311 
was considered proportionate for the project, providing appropriate representation of the 312 
range of valid expert judgements within the technical community, and it was considered to be 313 
consistent with the ONR’s Safety Assessment Principles. Also, despite the differences in the 314 
approach for a formal SSHAC Level 3 study, the objectives of the SE interactions were in 315 
line with the “multiple-expert assessment” approach defined in NUREG-2117, rather than the 316 
traditional “expert elicitation” approach. 317 
Although the TDT were seeking the SEs’ specialist judgements and comments, the 318 
synthesis and incorporation of any technical interpretations into the Hinkley PSHA, as well as 319 
the assessment of their defensibility, were fully the TDT’s responsibility, using the same 320 
“ownership” criterion as in NUREG-2117. Generally, the SEs provided similar judgements 321 
and hence the use of their inputs by the TDT was relatively straightforward. When differing 322 
judgements were encountered, the TDT carefully studied the various SE viewpoints and, if 323 
required, asked them for clarification before developing their final models in an objective, 324 
transparent and well-documented manner that sought to avoid “sponsor bias”. The final 325 
PSHA model includes some logic-tree branches that reflect alternative viewpoints provided 326 
through discussions with the SEs.   327 
4.3. Participatory Peer-Review 328 
Participatory peer review is an integral, and critical, part of state-of-the-art PSHAs for 329 
high-value infrastructure projects, and a key element of the SSHAC guidelines. It is strongly 330 
recommended by the USNRC for SSHAC Level 3 and Level 4 studies, and a requirement in 331 
the forthcoming update to NUREG-2117. Participatory peer review in this context means that 332 
the review is continuous throughout the project to ensure that advice and comments can be 333 
conveyed while there is still time to address them. 334 
The participatory peer review process implemented in the Hinkley PSHA broadly 335 
followed the requirements for a SSHAC Level 3 study, with a smaller number of members 336 
than could be expected for a SSHAC Level 3 study but greater flexibility and more frequent 337 
interactions with the TDT. As in the SSHAC guidelines, the role of the PRT for this project 338 
was focused in two main areas: process and technical review. The process review ensures that 339 
the PSHA approach conforms to the requirements of a high-level study, while the technical 340 
review is concerned with assessing that the full range of data, models and methods have been 341 
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duly considered, and that all technical decisions have been adequately justified and 342 
documented. Collectively, these two aspects of the peer-review process led to assurance that 343 
the work was performed appropriately. 344 
The main differentiators from the SSHAC methodology were: a closer interaction 345 
between the TDT and the PRT than normally done in SSHAC Level 3 projects, and the 346 
option for the PRT to co-opt SEs as part of the team when considered appropriate to cover 347 
specific technical areas. When PRT co-opted SEs also acted as SEs for the TDT, they were 348 
made aware of their change of role and asked to remain impartial on their assessment of the 349 
data interpretation and/or models developed by the TDT. Other factors contributing towards 350 
the objective assessment of the PRT co-opted SEs were: the participation of PRT co-opted 351 
SEs being limited to their attendance of workshops, where entire models (e.g., SSM or 352 
GMM) or hazard calculations results were presented and discussed rather than individual 353 
technical topics on which the PRT co-opted SEs may have engaged with the TDT under their 354 
role of SE. Also, PRT co-opted SEs’ comments and feedback from the workshops were 355 
provided directly to the PRT for the PRT’s evaluation and integration into a single 356 
consolidated PRT report. 357 
For the Hinkley PSHA some of the SEs were allowed to play both roles as co-opted 358 
members of the PRT and technical advisors to the TDT. This dual role was justified on the 359 
basis of a limited pool of experts and a constrained schedule, and potential bias on their 360 
assessments as co-opted members of the PRT was avoided by implementing the measures 361 
discussed above. However, the authors acknowledge that, if the schedule, budget and 362 
available pool of expertise allow it, it is preferable to have different SE in for these two roles. 363 
The interactions between the TDT and PRT were not limited to the review of 364 
deliverables, and face-to-face exchanges at the various Presentation Workshops held at 365 
various stages of the project, but also included the use of ad hoc teleconferences to discuss 366 
contentious issues as they arose. Where advised, the TDT produced “white papers” to help 367 
explain to the PRT a particular method or model in order to obtain “approval in principle” in 368 
advance of the development of the models and/or calculations, and submission of the 369 
deliverables. The use of teleconferences and white papers were invaluable tools to make the 370 
peer-review process as efficient as possible by reducing the likelihood of abortive work or 371 
major modifications following the PRT’s review of the final deliverables. 372 
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The PRT for the Hinkley PSHA comprised two members: Dr Hilmar Bungum and Dr 373 
Martin Koller, both highly respected international seismic hazard experts, with extensive 374 
experience of SSHAC Level 3 and Level 4 studies, and whose combined expertise covers a 375 
broad range of areas including seismic source modelling, ground-motion prediction, site 376 
characterization, and procedures to manage and incorporate expert judgement.  377 
A total of three SEs were co-opted by the PRT to provide advice on the fields of ground-378 
motion modelling, geological and tectonic interpretation, and site characterization and site-379 
response analysis. PRT co-opted SEs were invited to attend the Presentation Workshop 380 
corresponding to their area of expertise. 381 
4.4. Documentation 382 
One of the key differences between the lower (1 and 2) and higher (3 and 4) SSHAC 383 
levels of study is the emphasis placed on documentation of the evaluation and integration 384 
process; although in all cases a complete documentation of the PSHA is required. In a Level 385 
2 study, this is effectively left at the discretion of the TI team, with the result that it is 386 
difficult to assess the generic level of transparency and regulatory assurance that can be 387 
expected from this level of study. 388 
The approach implemented by the project delivery team for the Hinkley PSHA followed 389 
the documentation principles for higher-level SSHAC studies by incorporating thorough and 390 
detailed documentation of all “formal” interactions within the TDT, between the TDT and 391 
Subject Experts, and between the TDT and the PRT. This also included a comprehensive 392 
justification and reporting of all decisions taken in the development of the hazard model. 393 
While some of the formalism of SSHAC, in particular regarding team and expert 394 
interactions, was relaxed to meet the schedule of the project, as discussed above, the 395 
documentation process was instead rendered more formal than described in the SSHAC 396 
guidelines for a Level 3 study, with much the same aim. A hierarchical structure was adopted 397 
for the reporting of the various technical elements of the PSHA (e.g., historical seismicity, 398 
earthquake catalogue, ground-motion model), which is schematically represented in Figure 4.  399 
In general, Level 4 reports cover the data collation, review and assessment, and 400 
verification and validation of hazard calculations. Level 3 reports generally integrate the 401 
outputs of Level 4 reports to define input models to the PSHA and site response. The Level 2 402 
report is a summary of the whole PSHA process, while the Level 1 report is an executive 403 
summary of the project. Level 1 and Level 2 reports should be self-contained and sufficient to 404 
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obtain an informed overview of the study, without the need to consult lower level reports. A 405 
total of 19 technical reports were produced as part of the Hinkley PSHA, which together form 406 
the Safety Case justification for vibratory ground-motion hazard submitted to the ONR. 407 
 408 
Fig. 4 Hinkley PSHA reporting structure 409 
This hierarchical reporting structure facilitated a phased delivery and review of PSHA 410 
inputs and results, which contributed towards a smooth and timely delivery of the project, and 411 
helped to build peer-review and regulatory assurance progressively throughout the various 412 
stages of the project. 413 
In line with established practice for high-level PSHA studies, hazard input documents 414 
(HIDs) and site response input documents (SRID) were produced. The objective of the HIDs 415 
and SRIDs was to present in a clear and unambiguous manner to the seismic hazard and site 416 
response analysts, all the necessary information / data needed to perform the calculations 417 
undertaken at various stages of the project (e.g., preliminary hazard calculations, cross-418 
checking calculations and final hazard calculations). 419 
The development of high-quality HIDs and SRIDs was found to be a crucial element of 420 
the quality assurance system. Clear and unambiguous definition of the seismic hazard 421 
calculation requirements resulted in a quick convergence of the cross-checking calculations. 422 
These calculations were implemented by two independent teams using different software 423 
[i.e., CH2M using CRISIS2015 (Ordaz et al. 2015) and GEM using the OpenQuake-engine 424 
code (Pagani et al. 2014)], following a similar approach to that outlined in Bommer et al. 425 
(2013). The achieved differences in the results between the two sets of analyses, which are 426 
intrinsic to the use of different codes (e.g., Thomas et al. 2010), were smaller (typically below 427 
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1% on the calculated AFoEs, and in no case larger than 5%) than those observed in similar 428 
projects.  429 
5. Concluding remarks 430 
The implementation of the approach to PSHA described in this paper allowed the 431 
successful completion of the Hinkley PSHA, which achieved its two main objectives: 432 
 To achieve regulatory approval within the non-prescriptive UK nuclear regulatory 433 
environment for a new-build NPP at the Hinkley Point site; and 434 
 To complete the study within a relatively short period of time (21 months) and at 435 
considerably lower cost than a SSHAC Level 3 study. 436 
Nevertheless, it has to be acknowledged that the availability of previous (at their time 437 
state-of-the-art) seismic hazard studies for the site as well as the collective knowledge of the 438 
seismicity of the UK, in addition to ground-investigations carried out in advance of the 439 
commencement of the PSHA study, were important contributors to the short duration of the 440 
project. 441 
Although the approach to PSHA presented in this paper, which can be considered as an 442 
enhanced SSHAC Level 2, was developed to achieve regulatory approval within the UK 443 
nuclear regulatory context, it could be adapted to any other type of high-value and/or safety-444 
significant infrastructure, and regulatory environment, as a cost-effective approach with a 445 
high reliability assurance. 446 
A summary of the key features of the approach developed for this study, and its 447 
comparison against requirements for SSHAC Level 2 and Level 3 studies is presented in 448 
Table 2. The upcoming update to NUREG-2117 (USNRC 2018) will provide further 449 
guidance on the requirements for Level 2 studies, which has not been included in Table 2 as it 450 
is expected to represent the status of the SSHAC guidelines at the time the PSHA approach 451 
for this study was developed. USNRC (2018) will also provide guidance to Level 2 studies 452 
with augmented options, which resembles the approach described in this paper. 453 
Table 2 Attributes of the approach developed for this study in comparison with Level 2 and Level 3 454 
studies (after Table 4.2 of USNRC 2012) 455 
SSHAC  
Level 
SSHAC 
Component 
Level 2 This Study 
(Enhanced Level 2) 
Level 3 
Number of  Project Manager  Project Manager.  Project Manager. 
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SSHAC  
Level 
SSHAC 
Component 
Level 2 This Study 
(Enhanced Level 2) 
Level 3 
participants  Small TI 
(Technical 
Integrator) team. 
 Peer reviewers. 
 Hazard 
calculation team. 
 Resource experts 
 Proponent 
experts. 
 Project TDT. 
 Larger TDT team. 
 Peer reviewers. 
 Resource experts and 
proponent experts (jointly 
referred to as Subject 
Experts). 
 Hazard calculation team. 
 Project TI. 
 Larger TI team. 
 Peer reviewers. 
 Resource experts. 
 Proponent experts. 
 Data team. 
 Hazard calculation 
team. 
Interaction  Proponent and 
resource experts 
contacted 
individually. 
 Subject Experts contacted 
individually. 
 Individual members of the 
TDT then take on the role 
of proponent/resource 
experts at workshops, with 
the TDT as a whole acting 
as evaluator/integrator. 
 All interactions with 
Subject Experts are 
thoroughly documented 
and subjected to the 
scrutiny of the PRT. 
 Proponent and 
resource experts 
interact with TI 
Team in facilitated 
workshops. 
Peer review  Late stage.  Participatory. 
 PRT may include co-opted 
subject experts where 
appropriate to cover 
specific technical areas. 
 Participatory. 
Ownership  TI Team.  Technical Delivery Team 
(TDT). 
 TI Team. 
Transparency  Dependent on 
documentation. 
 Client and regulator can 
view interactions at 
workshops. 
 Participatory peer 
reviewers observe 
workshops and participate 
at all stages of the process 
where appropriate. 
 All interactions with 
Subject Experts as well as 
the evaluation and 
integration process are 
thoroughly documented. 
 Interested parties 
can view 
interactions at 
workshops. 
 Participatory peer 
reviewers observe 
workshops, 
participate in 
Workshop #3. 
 Dependent on 
documentation. 
Regulatory 
Assurance 
 Individual 
interaction with 
proponent and 
resource experts 
increases 
confidence over 
 Individual interaction with 
subject experts is 
thoroughly documented 
and subjected to the 
scrutiny of the PRT, hence 
increased confidence over 
 Interaction among 
proponent, 
resource, and 
evaluator experts 
in facilitated 
workshops greatly 
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SSHAC  
Level 
SSHAC 
Component 
Level 2 This Study 
(Enhanced Level 2) 
Level 3 
Level 1. 
 Depends on TI 
team; degree to 
which data, 
models, and 
methods are 
readily available; 
and success in 
obtaining 
additional 
information and 
understanding 
from individual 
interactions. 
Level 2. 
 Thorough documentation 
of all decisions and 
underlying rationale is a 
key component of the 
approach. 
 Hierarchical reporting 
structure ensures phased 
delivery to regulator as 
well as client. 
increases 
confidence over 
Level 2. 
 Documentation of 
evaluation and 
integration process 
by TI Team key to 
high levels of 
confidence. 
Cost  Slightly greater 
than Level 1 
because of time 
required for 
interaction with 
proponent and 
resource experts. 
 Greater than Level 2 due 
to greater number of 
participants and inclusion 
of workshops, but smaller 
than Level 3 by holding 
separate meetings with 
Subject Experts and 
Subject Experts’ 
judgements/views being 
integrated by the TDT at 
internal workshops. 
 Physical dispersion of 
team is limited, systems to 
remotely access data and 
information already in 
place as part of CH2M’s 
standard operations. 
 Use of telephone and 
video conferencing for 
interactions with subject 
experts wherever feasible.  
 TDT working meetings 
coincide with workshops, 
resulting in a reduced cost 
compared to Level 3 
where workshops and 
working meetings are 
typically kept separate. 
 Significantly 
greater than Level 
2 because of 
greater number of 
participants and 
use of facilitated 
workshops. 
 Greater likelihood 
that TI team 
members are 
physically 
dispersed, 
requiring costs for 
systems to 
remotely access 
data and 
information. 
 Costs associated 
with TI Team 
working meetings. 
Duration  Slightly greater 
than Level 1 
because of time 
required for 
interaction with 
proponent and 
resource experts. 
 Greater than Level 2 due 
to enhanced 
documentation and 
scrutiny of individual 
interactions with Subject 
Experts, and inclusion of 
workshops, hence need to 
 Significantly 
greater than Level 
2 because of 
constraints in 
organizing 
workshops around 
proponent and 
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SSHAC  
Level 
SSHAC 
Component 
Level 2 This Study 
(Enhanced Level 2) 
Level 3 
 Typically, 6-12 
months. 
consider personal 
schedules. 
 Shorter than Level 3 as 
constraints in organizing 
workshops are reduced by 
replacing direct 
intervention of external 
Subject Experts at 
workshops by a summary 
of individual interactions 
with these experts. 
 Between 18 and 24 
months. 
resource expert, TI 
team member, and 
PPRP member 
personal 
schedules. 
 Typically, ≥30 
months. 
Management 
Challenge 
 Slightly greater 
than Level 1 
because of need 
to interact 
individually with 
proponent and 
resource experts 
whose schedules 
cannot be 
controlled. 
 Intermediate between 
Level 2 and Level 3. 
 Subcontracts are typically 
required for subject 
experts. 
 Longer engagement of 
subject experts. 
 Significantly 
greater than Level 
2 because of 
increased number 
of participants (a 
number of whom 
may require 
subcontracts) and 
the logistics of 
organizing 
workshops. 
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